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There are many ways a government can capture the judiciary and influence
judgements even without taking explicitly confrontative legislative actions. Some
European countries have shown examples of supressing judges by criminal or
disciplinary procedures or paying off the judiciary with bonuses or salary raises.
However, the most effective way, since it is almost invisible, is when the court
administration makes sure that the ‘right judges’ will get the important cases.
At the Kúria, the Supreme Court of Hungary, there are several reasons for concern:
A case allocation rule laid down by the court president without the effective control
of judicial self-governance, the actual distribution of cases including human
intervention, the lack of transparency and the lack of remedies in the procedure,
and the wide possibility to reallocate cases contain the inherent risk that cases in
Hungary might not be decided by a court ‘prescribed by law’. Moreover, the present
case allocation rule of the Kúria yields great power to the President of the Grand
Chambers by letting him set up uniformity complaint panels for certain cases. This
system subordinates certain judges and presiding judges to others and clearly
violates the international standards regarding the allocation of cases.
International standards for the allocation of cases
The impartial and legitimate allocation of cases is crucial for guaranteeing the right
to a fair trial. The Universal Charter of the Judge laid down by the International
Association of Judges (IAJ) and also the European Network of the Councils for the
Judiciary (ENCJ) developed detailed standards for allocation of cases. According
to these standards, the procedure shall be based on objective rules and include the
right to a fair trial, the independence of the judiciary, the legality of the procedure, the
nature and complexity of the case, the competence, experience and specialisation of
the judge, the availability and workload of the judge, the impartiality of the judge and
the public perception of the independence and impartiality of the allocation.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) established that if doubts regarding
the impartiality in the allocation of the case were objectively justified, Article 6 (1) of
the Convention was violated (See cases Daktaras v. Lithuania [2000] and Miracle
Europe Kft v. Hungary [2016]). In the latter case regarding Hungary, the Court found
the discretional transfer of cases from one court to another by the President of the
National Judicial Office in violation of Article 6 (1) of the Convention. The court
assessed that the phrase ‘established by law’ covers not only the legal basis for the
very existence of a tribunal but also compliance by the tribunal with the particular
rules that govern it and the composition of the bench in each case. The ECtHR also
noted that the competence of the assignee court was determined by the decision
of the President of the National Judicial Office, who was elected by Parliament
and not within a system of judicial self-government. The discretionary nature of
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the reassignment manifested itself in the fact that there were neither ascertainable
reasons nor criteria as to which cases were to be transferred, and this situation
was ultimately capable of creating the appearance of lack of independence and
impartiality and did not offer the foreseeability and certainty that is required in order
for a court to be considered ‘established by law’.
For the reasons mentioned above, case allocation is a sacred issue in most
countries. In Austria, which has a general legal system similar to that of Hungary, the
Constitution declares that case allocation rules shall be fixed by the law and despite
the ministerial administration of courts, the local judicial committees (Personalsenat)
define the rules of allocation. In Germany, it would be almost unthinkable to transfer
a case from one judge to another or a certain judge who will deal with an ongoing
case, and a body where majority is elected by peer judges (Präsidium) has final
word in the allocation of cases. They have allocation rules not only for each court
but also for each chamber. In these countries a computer counts the cases and
guarantees that all cases are assigned to judges in a predefined way and excludes
the possibility of intervention by external or internal actors. The legal regulation of the
Hungarian case allocation system is very similar to the German one. But without a
computerized, automated allocation and by giving a key role to the court president,
the Hungarian system results in a very different practise.
The allocation of cases in Hungary
In Hungary, the ‘Act on the Organisation and Administration of Courts’ prescribes
that the judge to be appointed for a case shall be selected according to the
‘case allocation rule’. The case allocation rule of each court is laid down by the
court president upon hearing the opinion of the conference of judges and the
‘collegium’ (division). However, the opinion of the judicial self-governing body is not
binding and not even published, while the case allocation rules are accessible on
the court’s webpage. The case allocation rule defines in advance the structure and
number of the chambers of the court, the type of cases generally assigned to judges
(chambers), and also the rule of substitution, and designate the court leader (either
the court president or the subordinate court leader) to be in charge of the allocation
of cases and the methods by which the cases are allocated. These provisions
demand a fixed composition of chambers because the regulation becomes pointless
without it (Act 161 of 2011 Section 8-10).
At appeal courts in Hungary, judges are assigned to chambers according to the
case allocation rule, and each chamber is led by the Head of Chamber (presiding
judge) who is appointed following an application procedure by the court president. A
judge can be assigned to a new chamber by being newly appointed to the court, by
temporary secondment, but also by the discretionary decision of the court president.
There is no legal obstacle to transferring a judge from one chamber to another
without the consent of the judge.
In theory, the case allocation rule defines exactly which judge or chamber gets the
next case. If there is a specialization, it also defines how it shall be distributed among
the judges. Nevertheless, these rules can be vague and difficult to check. This gives
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the court president plenty of room to manoeuvre. Neither the parties nor the judge
can follow whether the case was allocated in accordance with the rules or if there
was a justifiable or malicious deviation from it. There is a recurrent debate in the
Hungarian judiciary over automated and computerized allocation of cases. The
arguments often brought forward against introducing such a system typically refer to
the different experience and competences of judges, the unequal case load, and the
comparatively large fluctuation that generates a large number of case reallocations
each year.
How court presidents can misuse their powers
There are several occasions when court presidents can misuse their powers
regarding case allocation rules to influence the outcome of court cases. One typical
scenario is this: A judge who had several years of experience adjudicating in
immigration cases was suddenly getting no more of these cases after officials of the
Immigration Authority complained to the President of the Administrative Court about
certain judgments. This judge was setting aside certain regulations of the Asylum
Act that defined Serbia as a ‘safe country’, alleging this regulation to be contrary to
EU law. There is no remedy against the allocation of cases by the President of the
Administrative Court.
Another scenario could involve a judge dealing with civil cases regarding personality
rights issues at a first instance court and applying for a position at the appeal court
since there was a vacancy in the appeal chamber that adjudicated in this field of
civil law. Despite the fact that the president of the appeal court did not support this
judge’s promotion, the judge succeeded in being appointed. During the application
procedure, the president changed the case allocation rules and transferred the
newly appointed judge to a different chamber, which was not allowed to deal with
personality right cases according to these newly changed rules, and a different judge
was transferred to the personality rights chamber who had no experience in this
special field of law.
These stories show how court presidents can change the case allocation rule and
prevent judges from dealing with certain cases, either by changing the rules of
distribution or moving the judge to a different chamber. At the end of the day, the
cards can be played in a way that assures that sensitive cases are dealt with by
trusted judges.
The reality at Kúria
The Kúria deals with appeal cases, revisions and in some matters (i.e. elections,
referendums, reviewing local government decrees) it is the one and only judicial
forum. The impact of the Kúria on adjudication was raised even more in 2020 when
a special panel for uniformity complaints was set up which could annul any decisions
of the ordinary panels of the Kúria. Moreover, a quasi-precedent system has been
introduced in Hungary as each decision of the Kúria is binding not only on judges of
the Kúria but also on lower courts, where judges need to justify if they deviate from
the case law.
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The case allocation rule of the Kúria was changed significantly by President Péter
Darák, who set up ‘Grand Chambers’ instead of the ordinary chambers with one
presiding judge and two judges. Now the cases are distributed among Grand
Chambers while it cannot be foreseen how the acting panels are assigned to cases.
For example, the case allocation rule prescribes that cases shall be distributed
automatically according to the last digit of the case number. However, there is only
one Grand Chamber that deals with tax, customs and financial supervision cases.
In this chamber there are three presiding judges – including the President of the
Kúria himself – and four judges. One of the presiding judges is commissioned in
the case allocation rule to administer the Grand Chamber, which makes the other
presiding judges de facto subordinated to him. Since 1 September 2020, the judges
of the Grand Chamber have not even been assigned to certain presiding judges in
administrative and criminal cases, and therefore not only the acting panel but also
the composition of the panels is set up in an unforeseeable way.
The uniformity complaint panel is presided by the Kúria President or his deputy and
has 8 judge members chosen by the President from different divisions of the Kúria.
The case allocation rule lists 10 judges from the Criminal Collegium, 10 from the
Administrative Collegium and 15 from the Civil Collegium; nevertheless it is not set
in the case allocation rule in what order the judges of the actual panel should be
selected by the President. This illustrates the importance of the appointment of the
President of the Kúria in respect of personal independence from political parties. The
President of the Kúria is elected by Parliament with a two-third majority.
The newly elected President of the Kúria András Zsolt Varga also deserves attention
in this discussion. He is a former member of the Constitutional Court and former
deputy to the Prosecutor General. The National Judicial Council (with a vote of
13:1) did not support his election due to his lack of judicial experience and the fact
that only ‘tailormade legislation’ made his nomination possible, which violates the
principle of rule of law. The ECtHR concluded in the case Miracle Europe Kft v.
Hungary that the discretional case transfer ordered by the President of the National
Judicial Office – elected not by the judges but by Parliament – violated the right to
a fair trial. It is unlikely that the ECtHR will come to a different conclusion regarding
the binding decision of the uniformity complaint panel, passed by judges carefully
selected and administered by András Zsolt Varga.
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